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Two of the characteristic traits of contemporary advanced societies are enhanced inﬂu-
ence (more bargaining power) of women and the large increase of single-person house-
holds. An intriguing question is therefore how the general equilibrium allocation of
resources and the formation of households are related to the power of particular soci-
ological groups.
In this paper we examine how individual power in groups can be integrated into general
equilibrium model and which type of phenomena we can explain by our model. We
discuss power under the assumption that individuals have the possibility to exit (leave
a multi-member household) and to form a single-person household or, in addition, to
join other households. Household members have individual preferences. The members
of a household make eﬃcient collective consumption decisions where diﬀerent house-
holds may use diﬀerent collective decision mechanisms. Households operate within a
competitive market environment. Moreover, at the going prices, individuals may de-
cide to become singles or to join other households. Therefore, neither households nor
deserting members have any market power. Nonetheless, individuals can exert power in
multi-member households. The departure from the traditional model of pure exchange
enables us to examine individual power in such households. Moreover, we are able to
identify and analyze the household structures that can prevail in equilibrium.
We introduce via example three diﬀerent concepts of power when group or consumption
externalities are present: “utilitarian power” as the weight of an individual in the
household welfare function, “bargaining power” as the weight of an individual in the
Nash-bargained decision of a household and “real power” as the incremental utility
an individual can achieve in a household in comparison with other possibilities, in
particular in comparison with exit.
Absence of externalities implies absence of bargaining or real power. In a two-person
household, a person creates externalities if, and only if, the other person receives exter-
nalities, and vice versa. Therefore, if a member neither creates nor receives externali-
ties, then both members lack bargaining or real power. We show that as soon as the
group size exceeds two, certain individuals can have bargaining and real power even if
they do not create or receive externalities themselves. We also show that there is no
monotonic relationship between the three power concepts.
2In the next step we study how real power is related to the eﬃciency of allocations.
After establishing existence of equilibria with free exit, we identify several cases where
Pareto-eﬃciency and manifestation of power go hand in hand.
We further study the special case of quasi-linear preferences to illustrate the main
results. We also use this case to illustrate what is called power spillovers: Changes in
bargaining or utilitarian power in particular households impact on other households.
Finally, we present various applications of our concepts. In particular, we exhibit
human relations paradoxa where none of the household members gains in equilibrium,
although non-consumptive beneﬁts from household formation increase. Moreover, we
demonstrate how implicit and determinate power and de jure and de facto power can
be derived from our power concepts.
The notion of power can have very diﬀerent meanings in economics. Concepts such as
market power, veto power, agenda setting power, voting power, bargaining power, and
power indices are well known.1 In this paper, we oﬀer a framework to deﬁne power in
a general equilibrium framework. Our paper is in the tradition of cooperative models
of households as recently surveyed by Apps and Rees (2007). We integrate collective
rationality of households into a general equilibrium model and we examine the role
of individual power in such a framework. Our paper is also related to the inﬂuential
work of Hirschman (1970) who has considered the comparative eﬃciency of the exit
and voice options as mechanisms of recuperation. One of our main results suggests
that the outside options limit power as long as externalities in groups are suﬃciently
small.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, we introduce the formal
framework and deﬁne an equilibrium with free exit and free household formation. In
section 4, we study diﬀerent concepts of power in groups and discuss their relationship
and equilibrium implications. In section 5, we discuss the relationship between power
and Pareto eﬃciency. In section 6, we consider the special case of quasi-linear utilities.
Section 7 contains applications. Section 8 concludes.
1Bell (1991) provides a subtle discussion of diﬀerent concepts of power in the literature on economic
development.
32 Consumer Characteristics and Allocations
In this section, we describe the basic structure of the model: consumers, household
structures, commodities, endowments, allocations, and preferences.
Consumers and Household Structures. We consider a ﬁnite population of con-
sumers, represented by a set I = {1,...,n}. A generic consumer is denoted by i or j.
The population I is partitioned into households, i.e. there exists a partition P of I into
non-empty subsets. We call any such partition P a household structure in I. If P
consists of H households, we frequently label them h = 1,...,H, provided this causes
no confusion. We treat the household structure as an object of endogenous choice.
Households are endogenously formed so that some household structure P is ultimately
realized. Consequently, our consumer allocation space is P, the set of all household
structures in I. A generic household is denoted by h or g. A single person household
formed by individual i is denoted by {i}. We denote H = {h ⊆ I : h 6= ∅}, the set of
all potential households.
Commodities. There exists a ﬁnite number ` ≥ 1 of commodities. Each commodity
is formally treated as a private good, possibly with externalities in consumption. Each
consumer i ∈ I has a consumption set Xi = I R
`
+ so that the commodity allocation
space is X ≡
Q
j∈I Xj. Generic elements of X are denoted x = (xi)i∈I, y = (yi)i∈I.
Commodities are denoted by superscripts k = 1,...,`. For a potential household
h ∈ H, set Xh =
Q
i∈h Xi, the consumption set for household h. Xh has generic ele-
ments xh = (xi)i∈h. If x = (xi)i∈I ∈ X is a commodity allocation, then consumption
for household h is xh = (xi)i∈h, the restriction of x = (xi)i∈I to h .
Endowments. For a potential household h ∈ H, its endowment is a commodity
bundle ωh ∈ I R
` given by the sum of the endowments of all participating individuals:
ωh =
P








Allocations. An allocation is a pair (x;P) ∈ X × P specifying the consumption
bundle and household membership of each consumer. We call an allocation (x;P) ∈
4X × P feasible, if
X
i∈I
xi ≤ ωS. (2)
After the speciﬁcation of individual preferences, by means of utility representations,
an allocation determines the welfare of each and every member of society.
Consumer Preferences. In principle, a consumer might have preferences on the
allocation space X × P and care about each and every detail of an allocation. For
individual i ∈ I, we assume that i has preferences on X × P represented by a utility
function Ui :X × P−→ I R.
In the following, we shall make the general assumption that an individual does not
care about the features of an allocation beyond the boundaries of his own household.
If a particular household structure is given, he is indiﬀerent about the aﬃliation and
consumption of individuals not belonging to his own household. Condition HSP is a
formal expression of this assumption — with a slight abuse of notation.
(HSP) Household-Speciﬁc Preferences:
Ui(x;P) = Ui(xh;h) for i ∈ h, h ∈ P, (x;P) ∈ X × P.
The general assumption HSP is justiﬁable on the grounds that we want to design a
model where multi-member households play a signiﬁcant allocative role. HSP still
admits a lot of ﬂexibility. For example, it permits various types of consumption ex-
ternalities. Later on, we shall exploit the occurrence of pure group externalities that
depend solely on the persons belonging to a household. To formulate the latter kind of
externalities, deﬁne Hi ≡ {h ⊆ I|i ∈ h} for i ∈ I. Hi is the set of potential households
of which i would be a member.
(PGE) Pure Group Externalities:
For each consumer i, there exist functions Uc
i : Xi → I R and U
g
i : Hi → I R
such that Ui(xh;h) = Uc
i (xi) + U
g
i (h) for xh ∈ Xh, h ∈ Hi.
PGE assumes that one can additively separate the pure consumption eﬀect Uc
i (xi)
from the pure group eﬀect U
g
i (h). Separation with respect to the consumption of
individual household members may also be possible. A very special case is the absence
5of externalities, corresponding to U
g
i ≡ 0. Since we will refer to it repeatedly, let us
distinguish this case by its own acronym.
(ABS) Absence of Externalities:
Ui(x;P) = Ui(xi) for i ∈ I, (x;P) ∈ X × P.
Optimality. We say that an allocation (x;P) is fully Pareto optimal if (x;P)
is feasible and there is no feasible allocation (x0;P 0) that satisﬁes (Ui(x0;P 0))i∈I >
(Ui(x;P))i∈I.2 Denote by M∗ the set of fully Pareto optimal allocations. If all util-
ity functions are continuous in consumption, M∗ is not empty (Gersbach and Haller
(2001)). We denote by P∗ ⊆ P the set of all potentially optimal household structures,
i.e. P ∈ P∗ if, and only if, there exists x such that (x;P) ∈ M∗.
3 Equilibrium
There are several conceivable ways to formulate an equilibrium state of a model with
variable household structure. We follow Gersbach and Haller (2003) and employ the
concepts of a competitive equilibrium with free exit, and of a competitive equilibrium
with free household formation. We introduce the formal deﬁnitions of both equilibrium
concepts. We consider a household h ∈ P and a price system p ∈ I R
`
+. For xh =
(xi)i∈h ∈ Xh,






denotes the expenditure of household h on household consumption plan xh at the price
system p. As p and xh are of diﬀerent dimension for multi-member households, we use
the ∗-product in lieu of the familiar inner product. Then h’s budget set is deﬁned as
Bh(p) = {xh ∈ Xh : p ∗ xh ≤ p · ωh}.
We next deﬁne the eﬃcient budget set EBh(p) as the set of xh ∈ Bh(p) with the
property that there is no yh ∈ Bh(p) such that
(i) Ui(yh;h) ≥ Ui(xh;h) for all i ∈ h;
2The notation “>” means in this context that Ui(x0;P0) ≥ Ui(x;P) for all i ∈ I and Ui(x0;P0) >
Ui(x;P) for at least one i ∈ I.
6(ii) Ui(yh;h) > Ui(xh;h) for some i ∈ h.
Further we deﬁne a state of the economy as a triple (p,x;P) such that p ∈ I R
`
+ is a
price system and (x;P) ∈ X × P is an allocation, i.e. x = (xi)i∈I is an allocation of
commodities and P is an allocation of consumers (a household structure, a partition
of the population into households). A state (p,x;P) is a competitive equilibrium
with free exit (CEFE) if it satisﬁes the following conditions:
1. xh ∈ EBh(p) for all h ∈ P.
2.
P
i∈I xi = ωS.
3. There are no h ∈ P, i ∈ h and yi ∈ B{i}(p) such that Ui(yi;{i}) > Ui(xh;h).
Finally a competitive equilibrium with free household formation (CEFH) is
a CEFE (p,x;P) that also satisﬁes:
4. There are no h ∈ P and g ∈ P, i ∈ h and yg∪{i} ∈ Bg∪{i}(p) such that
Uj(yg∪{i};g ∪ {i}) > Uj(xg;g) for all j ∈ g;
Ui(yg∪{i};g ∪ {i}) > Ui(xh;h).
Condition 1 reﬂects collective rationality as developed in the seminal contributions
by Chiappori (1988a, 1992) and Apps and Rees (1997), in contrast to the traditional
“unitary” model where households are treated like single consumers. Eﬃcient choice
by the household refers to the individual consumption and welfare of its members, not
merely to the aggregate consumption bundle of the household. Condition 2 requires
market clearing. Conditions 1 and 2 alone deﬁne a competitive equilibrium (p,x),
given household structure P, discussed and studied in Haller (2000) and Gersbach and
Haller (2001).
In addition, we impose condition 3 that no individual wants to leave a household and
participate as a one-member household in the market at the going equilibrium prices.
Condition 3 constitutes an individual rationality or voluntary participation (member-
ship) constraint. Conditions 1 to 3 together deﬁne a competitive equilibrium with
free exit. Conditions 1 to 4 together deﬁne a competitive equilibrium with free
household formation. Condition 4 requires that no individual can leave a household
7and can propose a feasible consumption allocation to the members of a new household,
created by the individual and another already existing household, which makes every-
body in the new household better oﬀ at the going equilibrium prices. We will work
primarily with CEFE. However, our concepts are applicable to CEFH, and some of our
examples allow for the more demanding equilibrium concept.
4 Example 1: The Notion of Power
Any discussion and deﬁnition of power in the present context ought to begin with the
neutrality theorem of Gersbach and Haller (2003). The neutrality or no-power theo-
rem states that in the absence of any externalities, individuals cannot achieve higher
utility levels by participating in households rather than acting and trading individually
— which renders the notion of power within households obsolete. For power to exist,
there has to be some advantage, some positive externality in household formation.3
We are going to show that the existence of externalities can, indeed, create power for
agents in a group. This is illustrated in an example with positive group externalities.
The example also serves to introduce three concepts of power.
4.1 Primitive Data of Example 1







i (h) where xk
i denotes the quantity of good k (k = 1,2) consumed by
individual i. U
g
i (h) captures the pure group externality contributing to the utility of










1 + ln v1 in case h = {1,2}, with v1 ≥ 1;
ln x1










2 + ln v2 in case h = {1,2}, with v2 ≥ 1;
ln x2


















3Another advantage of household formation could be household production. For instance, in a
reduced form of household production, household formation could simply augment the initial endow-
ment with resources: The collective endowment of a multi-member household could exceed the sum
of the individual endowments of household members.
8The variables v1 and v2 stand for the extent of group externalities that individual 1 and
2 experience when they live together. We further assume the individual endowments
w1 = (0,1/2),w2 = (0,1/2),w3 = (1,0).
4.2 Equilibria
Commodity prices are normalized so that p1 = 1. We ﬁrst look at equilibria with a
ﬁxed household structure. There exists a unique competitive equilibrium (p0;x0;P 0),






0 = (1,1), x
0
1 = (1/2,0), x
0
2 = (0,1/2), x
0
3 = (1/2,1/2).





where we assume that household g = {1,2} maximizes a utilitarian
social welfare function
Wg = αU1(x1) + (1 − α)U2(x2)
= αlnx
1
1 + (1 − α)lnx
2
2 + αlnv1 + (1 − α)lnv2,
subject to the budget constraint x1
1 + p2x2
2 = p2, where 0 < α < 1. The parameter α
can be interpreted as the weight of individual 1 in household g. Similarly, 1−α is the
weight of individual 2.
Since the group externalities do not aﬀect excess demand vectors of household g =
{1,2}, the excess demand vectors of the households g and h = {3}, denoted by zg and












A market equilibrium without exit considerations (p∗,x∗;P ∗) would require
p
∗ = (1,1/(2α)), x
∗
1 = (1/2,0), x
∗
2 = (0,1 − α), x
∗
3 = (1/2,α).
94.3 Exit Conditions and Power
















which imply α ≥ 1
2v1 = α and α ≤ 1 − 1
2v2 = α. Hence, if α ∈ [α,α] = [ 1
2v1,1 − 1
2v2],
then (p∗,x∗,P ∗) is a competitive equilibrium with free exit. We further obtain
Fact 1 ∂α/∂v1 < 0 and ∂α/∂v2 > 0.
An increase in the positive externality of individual 1 decreases the lower bound on
his weight in the household welfare function, since he is prepared to sacriﬁce more
consumption in order to stay in the household. If v1 = 1 we obtain α = 1
2 and thus
individual 1 has at least the same weight as individual 2. The opposite eﬀects occur
for α when v2 increases. 1 − α and thus the lower bound of the weight of individual 2
declines. For v2 = 1 we have α = 1
2.
At this stage it is useful to distinguish between diﬀerent notions of power in a group.
We follow closely the setup of the example and assume that the two-person household
g maximizes a utilitarian welfare function. Then we can distinguish between three
diﬀerent concepts of power in a competitive equilibrium with free exit.
• Utilitarian power, the weight of an individual’s utility in the household welfare
function.
• Bargaining power, the weight of an individual in the Nash-bargaining decision
of a household.
• Real power, the additional utility an individual can achieve in a household in
comparison with exit.
To discuss the three notions of power we denote by β and 1−β the relative bargaining
power of individual 1 and 2, respectively. Furthermore, let for i = 1,2, x0
i(p2) denote
consumer i’s individual demand at the price system (1,p2).
10Let us consider the possibility that, given the relative bargaining power, for every price







































Note that the household g = {1,2} uses as conﬂict outcomes the outside options avail-
able at the price p2. The outside option values amount to ln(1
2p2) for individual 1, and
ln(1
2) for the second individual. Using the household budget constraint x1
1 = p2 − p2x2
2,












This is an implicit equation for x2
2. Now suppose the same allocation is obtained in
a competitive equilibrium with free exit where the household maximizes its utilitarian
welfare function, with respective weights α and 1−α. Then we have x2
2 = 1−α and thus
equation (4) is an implicit equation for β(α), the bargaining power of individual 1 that











Note that by deﬁnition of β(α), α in Wg and β = β(α) in Ng lead to the same allocation














Higher utilitarian power, that is, a higher weight in the household welfare function,






for which the competitive equilibrium with free exit involving household g exists. The


















































We obtain the following comparisons of utilitarian, bargaining and real power.
• If α < 1
2v1 and thus agent 2 has a large weight 1−α, formation of household g is
impossible in equilibrium, since individual 1 would exit and utility is unaﬀected
by the weight. Moreover, no bargaining power or real power exists.
• If 1
2v1 ≤ α ≤ 1 − 1
2v2, formation of household g is possible. Higher utilitarian
power for an individual translates into higher bargaining power. However, only for
individual 2 does higher bargaining power yield higher real power. For individual
1, an increase in utilitarian and bargaining power yields a negative price eﬀect,
since the market value of the endowments of household g decreases. For this
individual, the negative price eﬀect and an increase in his bargaining power oﬀset
each other exactly and his utility remains constant.
• If α > 1− 1
2v2, individual 2 would leave the household and thus no bargaining or
real power exists anymore.
Overall, we observe that there is no monotonic relationship between utilitarian power,
bargaining power and real power.
4.4 Shift of Power and Externalities
One can further ask under what circumstances the social fabric is aﬀected by a change
of power within households. More speciﬁcally, the question is whether an equilibrium
household structure persists after a shift of bargaining power within households. In
the context of the current example, some straightforward answers can be given.
Fact 3 Some free exit equilibrium household structure can be upset by a shift of utili-
tarian power within households.
Fact 4 As long as there is any bargaining power at all, the free exit equilibrium house-
hold structure cannot be destroyed by a shift of bargaining power within households.
12The preceding discussion might suggest that an individual only has bargaining or real
power if he can generate positive group externalities (“externality generator”) for other
household members or experience positive group externalities (“externality receiver”)
when forming a household with other individuals. Indeed, it is obvious that:
Fact 5 Suppose that an individual is neither an externality generator nor an externality
receiver. Then his bargaining and real power in a two-person household is zero.
However, the same is no longer true in larger groups. Let us continue the example, but








1 + v1 in case h = {1,2} or h = {1,2,3} with 1
2 ≥ v1 ≥ 0
x1








2 + v2 in case h = {1,2} or h = {1,2,3} with 1
2 ≥ v2 ≥ 0
x2






















p = (1,1), x1 = (1/2 − v1,0), x2 = (0,1/2 − v2), x3 = (v1 + 1/2,v2 + 1/2).
Note that the allocation is an eﬃcient choice of the sole household h = {1,2,3} at the
going prices. Moreover, markets clear. And neither individual 1 nor individual 2 can
gain utility by leaving the household. Although individual i = 3 is neither an exter-
nality generator nor an externality receiver, he has all the bargaining power and has
real power. In fact he extracts all the surplus generated by the favorable externalities
which individuals 1 and 2 generate by living together. His only contribution is that
he does not destroy the externalities the other individuals in the group generate and
receive.
Fact 6 Suppose that an individual is neither an externality generator nor an externality
receiver. Then his bargaining and real power can be positive if he belongs to a household
with more than two members.
13Of course, there are other equilibria with free exit in the above example where all three
individuals have real power or in which the third individual is powerless.
5 Power and Pareto Eﬃciency
5.1 Existence of CEFE
The example in the previous section gives a ﬁrst impression of the relationship between
diﬀerent concepts of power and equilibrium allocations in pure exchange economies
with multi-person households. In the present section we begin a more systematic
investigation of this relationship. For that purpose we ﬁrst examine the structure of
CEFE and subsequently draw conclusions about power. We focus on societies where
groups either oﬀer an advantage or a disadvantage to their members at any given price
system. We consider a property called Large Group Advantage (LGA). Formally, the
requirement LGA is captured by the following conditions 1–3. To this end, we restrict
prices to the simplex
∆ =
(









We denote the relative interior of ∆ by ∆o. Further, let us choose q > 0 so that the
social endowment ωS belongs to the cube [0,q]`. Set Q = [0,2q]`. For a household h,
put Kh = {xh = (xi)i∈h ∈ Xh :
P
i∈h xi ∈ Q}.
(LGA) Large Group Advantage: We say that a multi-member household h has
large group advantage if:
1. Every member i ∈ h has a demand function x0
i(·), where x0
i(p) denotes the demand
of consumer i when trading individually from the endowment ω{i} at prices p ∈
∆o.
2. For every price system p ∈ ∆, there exists a non-empty, compact and convex set
Xh(p) ⊆ Bh(p) ∩ Kh which depends continuously on p.
3. For all p ∈ ∆o and xh ∈ Bh(p) ∩ Kh: xh ∈ Xh(p) iﬀ
Ui(xh;h) − Ui(x
0
i(p);{i}) ≥ δi(p) (6)
with some threshold δi(p) ≥ 0 holds for all i ∈ h.
144. For all p ∈ ∆, xh,yh ∈ Bh(p) ∩ Kh:
xh ∈ Xh(p) and Ui(yh;h) ≥ Ui(xh;h) for all i ∈ h implies yh ∈ Xh(p).
The key condition 2 is fulﬁlled for instance in the case of positive pure group external-
ities. Condition 3 implies condition 4 for p ∈ ∆o. But condition 4 is required to hold
for all p ∈ ∆.
Before formulating the existence theorem, we introduce two new concepts called strict
monotonicity of household preferences and boundary aversion.
Deﬁnition 1 (Strict Monotonicity (SM))
The Strict Monotonicity property holds for household h if for any two allocations






yi and (Ui(zh;h))i∈h À (Ui(xh;h))i∈h.
Deﬁnition 2 (Boundary Aversion) Consumer i ∈ I is boundary averse if for
all g,h ∈ Hi, xh = (xj)j∈h ∈ Xh, yg = (yj)j∈g ∈ Xg:
xi ∈ I R
`
++ and yi / ∈ I R
`
++ implies Ui(xh;h) > Ui(yg;g).
For completeness and later use we also state the concept of local non-satiation of
multi-person households and the redistribution property which have been introduced
in Gersbach and Haller (2001). Note that SM is neither implied by the redistribution
property (RP) nor by local non-satiation of multi-member households.
Deﬁnition 3 A household h is locally non-satiated if for every
xh ∈ Xh and every ² > 0, there exists yh ∈ Xh with
k xh − yh k|h|` < ² and (Ui(yh;h))i∈h > (Ui(xh;h))i∈h.
Deﬁnition 4 (Redistribution Property (RP)) The Redistribution Property holds
if for any household h and any two allocations xh,yh ∈ Xh with




i∈h yi and (Ui(zh;h))i∈h À (Ui(xh;h))i∈h.
4The notation “À” means that the strict inequality holds for each person.
15Now we present our ﬁrst result, the existence of non-trivial CEFE.
Proposition 1 Suppose P is a household structure and the following conditions hold:
(i) ωh À 0 for all h ∈ H.
(ii) Ui(xh;h) is continuous and concave in xh ∈ Xh for all i ∈ h,h ∈ H.
(iii) Ui(xi;{i}) is strictly increasing in xi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ I.
(iv) LGA holds for all households h ∈ P with |h| ≥ 2.
(v) SM holds for some household h ∈ P with |h| ≥ 2.
Then there exists a competitive equilibrium with free exit of the form (p,x;P).
The proof is given in the appendix. The proposition states that any household struc-
ture in which all individuals in all households can gain, at least in principle, from
participating in the household, qualiﬁes to be part of an equilibrium with free exit.
5.2 CEFE, Power and Pareto Eﬃciency
In this subsection, we are going to examine equilibria with free exit and, speciﬁcally,
to look for Pareto eﬃciency and manifestation of power. We start with the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose pure group externalities, that is Ui(xh;h) = Uc
i (xi) + U
g
i (h)
for xh ∈ Xh,h ∈ H. If
(i) (p,x) is a competitive equilibrium of the pure exchange economy represented
by (Uc
i ,ω{i})i∈I, where all Uc
i ,i ∈ I, satisfy local non-satiation, and
(ii) P ∗ is the unique optimal household structure based solely on group preferences
represented by U
g
i ,i ∈ I,
then the state (p,x;P ∗) is a fully Pareto optimal CEFE and there does not exist another
CEFE in which real power is higher for some individuals in their respective households
and not less for any individual.
16The proof is given in the appendix. We illustrate Proposition 2 by means of an example.
Example 2
We can again use the main example 1 in section 4. Clearly, the household structure
P ∗ = {{1,2},{3}} is the unique optimal household structure based solely on group
preferences. The competitive equilibrium based solely on Uc
i (xi), where all individuals




















real power, denoted by ρ0






















In any other CEFE that can generate real power we must have P = P ∗. As discussed





with α denoting the utilitarian weight of individual 1 in the household {1,2} and
α ∈ [ 1
2v1,1 − 1












Hence, compared to (p0,x0,P ∗) if ρ1 is larger than ρ0
1
³
i.e. if α > 1
2
´
then ρ2 is smaller
than ρ0
2. Conﬁrming Proposition 2, it is impossible that real power in a CEFE is larger
for some individuals and not less for others than in (p0,x0,P ∗).
Next we examine a more elaborate example:
17Example 3
Let ` = 2, I = {1,2,3}. The individual endowments are as in Examples 1 and 2.
Preferences are represented by Ui(xh;h) = Ui(xi) + U
g








1 + lnv1 in cases h = {1,2} or h = I, with v1 ≥ 1
ln x1








2 + ln v2 in cases h = {1,2} or h = I, with v2 ≥ 1
ln x2
















3 in all other cases
We ﬁrst examine CEFE with P = {{1,2}, {3}}. For that household structure, equi-
libria take the same form as in our main example 1 with v3 = 1. We can maximize the
power of individual 1 by setting α = 1 − 1
2v2, which leads to p2 =
v2
2v2−1 and we obtain
real power in equilibrium as:
b ρ1 = ln
1
2















b ρ3 = 0.
We next look at equilibria for P = {I}. Note that this is the unique optimal household
structure. The household I is assumed to maximize the utilitarian welfare function
WI = α1 (lnx
1
1 + lnv1) + α2 (lnx
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1 + α1 − α2
.
18The parameters α1,α2 will be determined such that the exit conditions are fulﬁlled.





























































Fact 7 Real power of individual 1 in a CEFE with P = {{1,2}, {3}} does not exceed
the maximal real power of individual 1 in a CEFE with P = {I}. It v3 > 1, then real
power of individual 1 in a CEFE with P = {{1,2}, {3}} is less than the maximal real
power of individual 1 in a CEFE with P = {I}.
The proof is given in the appendix.
One might conjecture that the intuition developed above extends to more general
settings. In particular, one might expect that a CEFE, for which no other CEFE
exists in which real power is weakly higher for all individuals, is fully Pareto optimal.
This is an open question. But we do know from Gersbach and Haller (2003) that CEFE
are not necessarily fully Pareto optimal. Therefore, one may ask when there exists a
CEFE that is fully Pareto optimal. An interesting case where CEFE are fully Pareto
optimal is the case of quasi-linear preferences to be explored in detail in section 6.
6 Quasi-linear Preferences and Spillovers
In this section, we consider the special case of quasi-linear preferences. This case allows
to illustrate our main propositions. It also serves to illustrate to what extent changes
of bargaining power in one household aﬀect other households. Such an eﬀect is called
power spillover.
196.1 Model
We examine a society where n = I/2 > 1 two-member households will be formed.
Household h = 1,...,n has members h1 and h2, called the ﬁrst member and the
second member. This household structure is denoted by b P. There are ` > 1 goods.
The consumption of good k (k = 1,...,`) by individual hi (i = 1,2) is denoted xk
hi.






denotes the consumption of household member hi.






. The two members of household






















h2 + v2 (8)




The parameters v1 and v2 (v1 > 0, v2 > 0) capture the group externalities that in-
dividuals h1 and h2 experience when living together. Living together with the same
type of individual5 or in a household with more than two individuals is assumed to
exert negative group externalities on everybody. Hence, such households will never be















subject to Uh1(xh1)−Uh1 (x0
h1(p)) > 0 and Uh2(xh2)−Uh2 (x0
h2(p)) > 0, where 0 < βh < 1
is the bargaining power of individual h1 in household h. The functions x0
h1(p) and x0
h2(p)
denote consumer h1’s and h2’s individual demand at the price system p when they are
singles.
6.2 Equilibria, Power Shifts and Power Spillovers
For the household structure b P, we denote equilibrium values by b xk
hi, equilibrium utilities
by b Uhi and b Vhi and the equilibrium prices by b p. In the following, we assume that for
any array of bargaining power parameters (β1,...,βn) under consideration: (a) Every
household member consumes a non-negative amount of the num´ eraire good ` in every
market equilibrium. (b) For the given household structure, the economy has a unique
market equilibrium, up to price normalization. We obtain:
5That is, if members h1 and g1 of two diﬀerent households g ∈ b P and h ∈ b P formed a new
























(iv) Suppose that households are homogeneous with respect to utility representations
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h2 = (1 − βh)w
` + (1 − βh)
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The proof is given in the appendix. As Proposition 3 illustrates, a change of bargaining
power in household h only inﬂuences the distribution of the num´ eraire in household h.
Consumption of the ﬁrst `−1 commodities and consumption in other households are
not aﬀected. We formulate this observation as
Corollary 1 A change of βh in a particular household h has no impact on individuals
in other households.
The corollary states that there are no power spillovers in the case of quasi-linear pref-
erences as bargaining power changes do not aﬀect prices. This also means that a
household h cannot manipulate outcomes and possibly improve utility of household
members at the expense of outsiders by misrepresenting internal bargaining power.6
Another immediate consequence of Propositions 2 and 3 and the proof of the latter is
6Makowski, Ostroy and Segal (1999) have comprehensively characterized continuous, eﬃcient and
anonymous incentive compatible mechanisms and have shown that such mechanisms must be perfectly
competitive. Quasi-linear preferences are one of the examples that can allow for incentive compatible
mechanisms or perfect competition. Our investigation shows that with quasi-linear preferences and
the exit option a multi-person household has no incentive to misrepresent the internal bargaining
power.
21Corollary 2 The equilibrium (p,x, b P) is a CEFE and fully Pareto optimal.
Namely, b Uh1 − Uh1 (x0
h1(b p)) > 0 and b Uh2 − Uh2 (x0
h2(b p)) > 0 are satisﬁed, since v1 > 0
and v2 > 0. Hence (p,x, b P) is a CEFE. Next, the pair (p,x) is an equilibrium of
the economy with single-person households and endowment allocation x, since the
individual ﬁrst-order conditions for utility maximization are satisﬁed. Further, b P is
an optimal household structure. Therefore, by Proposition 2, (x, b P) is fully Pareto
optimal.
6.3 The Impact of Group Externalities
In previous sections, we stressed the role of group externalities. Since the equilibrium
is independent of the group externalities v1 and v2 as long as the exit conditions are
fulﬁlled we obtain from Proposition 3:
Corollary 3
Suppose that households are homogeneous with respect to utility representations and

























> 0, i 6= j.
Hence, if individual h1 gains relatively more from living in household h, i.e. when v1
increases, he receives less of the num´ eraire good. But the net eﬀect on utility is positive.
Since equilibrium prices are not aﬀected, real power of both individuals increases when
v1 is higher.
227 Applications and Extensions
While our analysis has primarily been focused on the three concepts of power, fruitful
extensions in a variety of directions are possible and illustrated in this section by way
of examples.
7.1 Human Relations Paradoxes
In this subsection we illustrate certain human relations paradoxes where the non-
consumptive, e.g. emotional beneﬁts from household formation increase, but none
of the household members gains in equilibrium.
For this purpose we reconsider the example of section 4. Conventional wisdom has
it that if a party has all the bargaining power, it can extract all the surplus from a
relationship. Consequently, if the surplus increases, this party should beneﬁt. This
logic also applies here. If consumer 1 exerts total bargaining power, β = 1, then he
can extract all the surplus created by household h up to the point where consumer 2 is
indiﬀerent between staying in the household and leaving. So let us assume β = 1. Now
suppose that v2, the amount of positive group externality which consumer 1 exerts on
consumer 2 increases, so that for whatever reasons consumer 2 derives more social or
emotional beneﬁt from having consumer 1 around. Would consumer 1 gain from such
a change? Ceteris paribus, their total surplus would increase and, by the above logic,
consumer 1 would be the sole beneﬁciary. But it turns out that neither consumer 1
nor 2 beneﬁts if a corresponding equilibrium price adjustment occurs.
Notice that we assume β ≡ 1. Hence α = α = 1− 1
2v2. The upper bound α is increasing
in v2. Therefore, the equilibrium price p∗ = 1/(2α) declines in v2. Indiﬀerence of
consumer 2 between staying and leaving requires ln(x∗
2)+lnv2 = ln(1/2) which amounts
to x∗
2 = 1/(2v2). As v2 increases, more of the household endowment of good 2 will be
sold in exchange for good 1. But because of the decline of the equilibrium price p∗
2,
consumer 1 cannot aﬀord more than the previous consumption level x∗
1.
Hence, there is the paradoxical situation that an increase in positive group externalities
does not translate into higher utility for any of the household members. The only one
to gain is consumer 3, whose equilibrium utility goes up. This is not always so. Still
with β ≡ 1 in the example in section 4, the beneﬁts from an increase of v1 accrue solely
23to consumer 1. With β ≡ 0, we obtain α = α. If v1 increases, both consumer 1 (due to
higher group externalities ln v1) and consumer 2 (due to full bargaining power) share
in the gain to the detriment of consumer 3. If v2 increases, the beneﬁts accrue solely
to consumer 2.



















ln(2v2) − ln α
Moreover, α ∈ (α,α). If v1 increases, then α must decrease to preserve the equation.
As a result, consumers 1 and 2 both gain at the detriment of consumer 3. If v2
increases, then α must increase in order to preserve the equation. Hence consumer
3 gains, consumer 2 loses in terms of utility from consumption but gains in terms of
group externalities, and consumer 1 is unaﬀected by the increased group externality
— another paradoxical outcome.
The paradoxes occur because of a drastic price eﬀect in response to preference changes,
whereas in a typical large economy, a small household can only cause negligible price
eﬀects. However, a suﬃciently widespread change of consumer characteristics can have
drastic price eﬀects also in a large economy. For instance, our conclusions immediately
generalize to the case of a replica economy where consumers 1, 2, and 3 are replaced
by respective consumer types 1, 2, 3 and there is the same number of consumers of
each type.
7.2 Implicit and Determinate Power
The eﬃcient collective choice condition, xh ∈ EBh(p), does not require each household
to have a utilitarian social welfare function that it maximizes to reach eﬃcient decisions.
It need not maximize a Nash product either. Indeed, a household need not maximize
any numerical objective function at all to arrive at eﬃcient decisions. For example, a
household h may adhere to a hierarchical rule and proceed as follows. First maximize
U1(xh;h) subject to xh ∈ Bh(p), with value U1. Next maximize U2(xh;h) subject to
xh ∈ Bh(p) and U1(xh;h) = U1, with value U2, and so on. Does this mean that all the
appealing power concepts are gone? Not completely, since one can ask, for example,
24which utilitarian social welfare weights would have lead the household to make the same
decision. Hence, we can talk about the implicit power behind an eﬃcient collective
household decision.
With explicit and implicit power, we face the fundamental question of what the de-
terminants of power within the household are, given that the concept of competitive
equilibrium with free exit per se leaves power indeterminate. In this subsection, we
show how the determinants of power can be divided into a personal component (per-
sonality attributes broadly deﬁned) and an equilibrium component (speciﬁc to the
equilibrium ultimately realized).
Suppose that the balance of power within a household might be determined by a per-
sonality proﬁle, πh = (πi)i∈h, of the household members, where each πi represents the
personality attributes of individual i. Let Πh denote the set of conceivable personal-
ity proﬁles for household h. Let us assume that a personality proﬁle translates into
eﬃcient decisions for the household as follows. Formally, there is a mapping
R
h : I R
` × Π
h → Xh
with Rh(p,πh) ∈ EBh(p) for any price system p and personality proﬁle πh. For a ﬁxed
proﬁle πh, we will simply work with the reduced form Rh(·) = Rh(πh,·). The latter
is merely a reﬂection of our static model and ignores the fact that perceived or actual
personalities may change over time. Depending on the household’s personality proﬁle,
the eﬃcient decision rule Rh may assume many forms, for example:
• Rh can be a utilitarian rule with weights αh
i ,i ∈ h.
• Rh can be a Nash-bargaining rule with bargaining powers βh
i ,i ∈ h.
• Rh can be the hierarchical rule depicted earlier.
• Rh can be the “Rawlsian rule” that maximizes the minimum utility among
household members subject to eﬃciency.
No matter what the rule, the household will make a determinate choice xh = Rh(p)
at equilibrium prices which determines, explicitly or implicitly, the “utilitarian”, “bar-
gaining” and “real” power within the household. The remaining indeterminacy is due
to multiplicity of equilibria. To see this, consider a multi-member household h whose
25eﬃcient decision rule is a Nash-bargaining rule with bargaining powers βh
i ,i ∈ h. Then
to the extent that this household is formed, the “bargaining” power of member i is triv-
ially βi = βh
i and independent of the particular equilibrium. But “utilitarian power”
can vary across equilibria. For example, suppose that there are two equilibria where this
household is formed, one with equilibrium price system p, the other with equilibrium
price system p0, and that p and p0 are not collinear. Since in the household’s bargain-
ing problem, both the feasible set of utility allocations and the reservation utilities are
price-sensitive, typically Rh(p) 6= Rh(p0). But then, as a rule, the implied distribution
of “utilitarian” power within the household diﬀers across the two equilibria.
Now consider instead a household h whose eﬃcient decision rule is utilitarian with
weights αh
i ,i ∈ h. This keeps “utilitarian” power within the household constant
whereas “bargaining” power may diﬀer across equilibria. Incidentally, this cannot
happen to household g = {1,2} in subsection 5.1, since the right-hand side of (5) de-
pends only on exogenous variables. Let us therefore present another example.
Example 5 Let ` = 2,I = {1,2,3,4}. Let xk
i denote the amount of good k = 1,2
consumed by person i = 1,2,3,4. We consider the two two-person households g =
{1,2} and h = {3,4}. Preferences are represented by utility functions Ui,i ∈ I, with










2 + ln2 in case g is formed
lnx2










4 + ln2 in case h is formed
lnx2
4 in all other cases







4 = 1/2. Let us compare for this economy the two
equilibria E = (p,x,P) and E0 = (p0,x0,P 0) given by P = {g,h}, P 0 = {{1},{2},h},
and
p = (1,1), x1 = (1.5,0), x2 = (0,1.5), x3 = (2.5,0) x4 = (0,2.5);
p0 = (1,4/3), x0
1 = (4/3,0), x0
2 = (0,2), x0
3 = (8/3,0), x0
4 = (0,2).
Next suppose that at an equilibrium price system of the form p∗ = (1,p2), the household
26h reaches the same decision when maximizing a Nash product, where the relative
bargaining power equals βh
3 = β,βh
4 = 1 − β. The values of the exit options are U0
3 =
ln p2 and U0
4 = ln(4/p2). Using the household budget constraint x2
4 = (4+p2−x1
3)/p2,











ln(4 + p2 − x1
3) − ln 2
. (12)
Now at E, we obtain β/(1 − β) = 4.106 and β = 0.804. And at E0, we obtain
β0/(1 − β0) = 2.409 and β0 = 0.707. We can also calculate the “real power” of 3 and 4
in each equilibrium. Then the comparison turns out as follows:
3 at E 3 at E0 4 at E 4 at E0
utilitarian power 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
bargaining power 0.804 0.707 0.196 0.293
real power 0.916 0.693 0.223 0.288
The example illustrates that bargaining and real power diﬀer across equilibria even
though utilitarian power remains constant. For ease of computation, we have looked
at two equilibria, E and E0, with diﬀerent household structures, P and P 0. In more
complex economies, we could ﬁnd examples with P = P 0, for there might exist multiple
competitive equilibria with free exit and identical household structures, but diﬀerent
equilibrium allocations and relative prices, and therefore diﬀerent degrees of power.
7.3 De jure and de facto Power
Household members are not able to exit in all cases even though they would do better
alone. In fact a household member may be deprived of any right of decision. Thus
it has no direct inﬂuence on the household’s consumption decision and lacks freedom
of association. It never decided to join this household. It is not allowed to leave the
household without the consent of others. Even if it had permission, it could not aﬀord
to leave because of lack of independent resources. Therefore, it does not have a serious
exit threat. This is most obvious for children. If the exit threat is de jure not possible
for a subset of individuals, our equilibrium concept can be modiﬁed accordingly. This
allows us to distinguish further between de jure and de facto power. Suppose that
27a subset Io in the set of all individuals I has no right to leave a household. Then
condition 3 of a competitive equilibrium with free exit becomes:
3. There is no h ∈ P, i ∈ h, i ∈ I \ I0 and yi ∈ B{i}(p) such that
Ui(yi;{i}) > Ui(xh;h).
The notion of utilitarian power can be deﬁned accordingly for dependent persons,
i.e. persons in the subset I0 and may also be called de facto power. The notions of
bargaining power and real power, however, require de jure power and are no longer
deﬁned.
De jure powerless people can have de facto power. For instance, the young enfant
terrible who terrorizes the rest of the family may beneﬁt a lot from de facto power.
First, the negative group externalities caused by the kid can be weakened by oﬀer-
ing him prodigal consumption as a bribe for good behavior. Note that in this case,
the externalities from belonging to a group and utilities from consumption cannot be
separated any longer. Second, the rest of the household may have or feel a ﬁduciary
duty towards the youngster so that the welfare or consumption of the kid causes some
positive externality for the rest of the household. Finally, out of sheer self-interest the
rest of the household may devote resources to the child’s upbringing (Becker (1993)):
For example, parents worried about old-age support may try to instill in their children
feelings of guilt, obligation, duty, and ﬁlial love that indirectly, but still very eﬀectively,
can “commit” children to helping them out.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented several ideas how to identify diﬀerent forms of power
in general equilibrium. The paper oﬀers a sequence of concepts, examples and appli-
cations. Each part of the paper can be extended and deepened — which promises a
host of future research topics.
289 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We apply the construction in the proof in Gersbach and Haller (2003) to all house-
holds. Speciﬁcally, each household h ∈ P is assumed to maximize, for each p ∈ ∆, its





on its restricted budget set Xh(p). Following the logic of Gersbach and Haller (2003),
the household’s aggregate demand correspondence Dh(·) is u.h.c. for all h ∈ P. Ag-
gregation across households in P yields that Φ(·), the market excess demand relation
resulting from reduced budget sets is non-empty-valued, convex-valued, u.h.c., and sat-
isﬁes the strong form of Walras’ law. By Theorem 6.37 of Ellickson (1993), there exists
a pair (p,z) ∈ ∆ × I R
` with
(a) z ∈ Φ(p) and
(b) z ≤ 0 and z = 0 whenever p À 0.





where dg ∈ Dg(p) for each g ∈ P.
By the following observation we can rule out that a price is zero. Suppose the quasi-
equilibrium price pk∗ = 0 for some k∗, 1 ≤ k∗ ≤ `. Let us consider a household
h for which |h| ≥ 2 and SM holds. According to our construction, dh =
P
i∈h xi
where xh = (xi)i∈h maximizes Wh on Xh(p). Moreover, dh ≤
P
g∈P dg ≤ ωS ∈ [0,q]`.











i + ∆, k = k
∗,
for all i ∈ h, with some suitably chosen ∆ > 0, belongs to Bh(p) ∩ Kh and satisﬁes
yh > xh. Since SM holds for household h, there exists y0
h ∈ Bh(p) ∩ Kh such that
29(Ui(y0
h;h))i∈h À (Ui(xh;h))i∈h. But then Wh(y0
h) > Wh(xh), a contradiction. Hence,
to the contrary, p À 0.
Therefore, we have z = 0. Next, a standard argument shows that each xh maximizes
Wh on Bh(p). Thus, xh ∈ EBh(p). Finally, from the characterization of Xh(p) in
LGA, no individual wants to exit a household h ∈ P and (p;x;P) is a competitive
equilibrium with free exit.
Proof of Proposition 2
For i ∈ I and P ∈ P, let P(i) denote the household to which i belongs in the household
structure P.
First, we show that (x;P ∗) is a fully Pareto optimal allocation. For suppose not.
Then there exists a feasible allocation (y;P) such that Ui(yi;P(i)) > Ui(xi;P ∗(i)) for
some i ∈ I and Ui(yi;P(i)) ≥ Ui(xi;P ∗(i)) for all i ∈ I. Since (p,x) is a competitive
equilibrium of the pure exchange economy (Uc
i ,ω{i})i∈I and consumers are locally non-
satiated, x is a Pareto optimal allocation of the pure exchange economy. Therefore, if
it is the case that Uc
i (yi) > Uc





j (P(j)) > U
g
j (P ∗(j)) for some j 6= i. If it is the case that Uc
i (yi) ≤ Uc
i (xi) for all i,
then U
g
j (P(j)) > U
g
j (P ∗(j)) for some j. In any case, U
g
j (P(j)) > U
g
j (P ∗(j)) for some
j. But then there exists an optimal household structure P 0 such that U
g
j (P 0(j)) ≥
U
g
j (P(j)) > U
g
j (P ∗(j)) and, consequently, P 0 6= P ∗, contradicting (ii).
Second, we show that (p,x;P ∗) is a CEFE. Let i ∈ I. Since (p,x) is a competitive
equilibrium of the pure exchange economy (Uc
i ,ω{i})i∈I and pure group externalities
prevail, the ﬁrst two conditions for a CEFE hold. Moreover:
(a) Since (p,x) is a competitive equilibrium of the pure exchange economy (Uc
i ,ω{i})i∈I,
xi is an optimal consumption bundle in i’s budget set.
(b) Since P ∗ is the unique optimal household structure, U
g
i ({i}) ≤ U
g
i (P ∗(i)), by
the argument given before.
Hence i cannot fare better as a one-person household. Thus the third condition for a
CEFE holds as well.
30Third, we show that there does not exist another CEFE in which real power is higher
for some individuals in their respective households and not lower for any individual.
Namely, suppose that there exists a CEFE (p0,y;P 0) in which real power is higher for
some individuals and not lower for any individual than in (p,x;P ∗). Hence,
U
c

























for all i, with strict inequality for some i. As P ∗ is unique, we obtain U
g
i (P 0(i)) ≤
U
g
i (P ∗(i)) for all i by a previous argument. Therefore,
U
c




























i (yj), contradicting Uc
i (yi) ≥ Uc
i (x0
i(p0)). Therefore, p0yi ≥ p0ω{i} for
all i ∈ P 0(j). Since y
P0(j) ∈ EB
P0(j)(p0), this implies p0yi = p0ω{i} and, consequently,
Uc
i (yi) ≤ Uc
i (x0




results. Hence, to the contrary, it cannot be the case that in the CEFE (p0,y;P 0), real
power is higher for some individuals and not lower for any individual than in (p,x;P ∗).
Proof of Fact 7

















2+1)v1 and α1 ≥
1+α2
4v1+1.
















2+1)2v2 which is equivalent to α2 ≥
1−α1
4v2−1.


































31which implies (1−α1 −α2)(p∗
2 +1) ≥ 1/v3 or 1−α1 −α2 ≥ (1+α1 −α2)/(2v3) which
ﬁnally is equivalent to α1 ≤
2v3−1
2v3+1 · (1 − α2).
step 2: We next examine whether real power of individual I can be equal or higher
under the household structure P = {{1,2}, {3}} than under P = {I}, i.e. we examine
whether it is possible to delineate parameter values such that b ρ1 ≥ max{ρ∗
1}. The





















1 − α1 + α2
)
In order to maximize ρ∗















· (1 − α2).









and the right hand side of the last constraint is monotonically decreasing in α2. Hence







where the constraint amounts to








(2v2 − 1)(2v3 − 1)
2(v2 − v3 + 2v3v2)
< 1.
Hence, maximization of ρ∗
1 is obtained by
α1 =
(2v2 − 1)(2v3 − 1)
2(v2 − v3 + 2v3v2)
.







which implies α1 ≤
2v2−1
6v2−2. Hence, b ρ1 ≥ max{ρ∗
1} yields
(2v2 − 1)(2v3 − 1)




which implies 4v3v2 − 4v2 − v3 ≤ −1 or 4v2(v3 − 1) ≤ v3 − 1.
In case v3 > 1, the latter implies 4v2 ≤ 1 which contradicts v2 ≥ 1 and, therefore,
b ρ1 < max{ρ∗
1} has to hold.
In case v3 = 1, b ρ1 > max{ρ∗
1} would yield 0 = 4v2(v3 − 1) < v3 − 1 = 0 and, thus,
0 < 0; therefore, b ρ1 ≤ max{ρ∗
1} has to hold.
Hence, there are no parameter constellations such that the maximal power of individual
1 in a CEFE with P = I is strictly smaller than b ρ1.
Proof of Proposition 3
Good ` serves as a num´ eraire so that the price system assumes the form (p1,...,p`−1,1).


























− λh = 0
Therefore:
7Note that our assumption of suﬃcient endowments of all households with the num´ eraire good

















= pk, k = 1,...,` − 1 (14)
Hence, the demand of household h for commodities k = 1,...,` − 1 is independent
of the bargaining power βh and 1 − βh of individual h1 and h2, respectively. Hence,
by the budget constraint and budget exhaustion also the aggregate household demand
for commodity ` is independent of βh. Therefore, market equilibria do not depend on
internal bargaining power of households and, hence, changes of bargaining power in
household h have no eﬀect on equilibrium prices. This establishes points (i) and (ii).
However, a shift of the power in households aﬀects the distribution of the num´ eraire
good in household h. Using the notation for the equilibria we have from equation (13):
βh
b Vh1 + b x`




b Vh2 + b x`




h1(p)) and b Vh2,v2,Uh2(x0
h2(p)) are independent of βh and b x`
h1 + b x`
h2









If households are completely homogeneous with respect to Uhi and wh, a household
equilibrium does not involve any positive net trades, again using the fact that diﬀer-
ences in βh have no eﬀect on aggregate excess demand. Therefore, b x`
h1 + b x`
h2 = w`
h and
via equation (15) we obtain (iv).
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